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<C-AB>Abstract: The theory of psychosis and autism as diametrical disorders offers a 
tractable and testable view of normal and abnormal human cognitive variation as a 
function of opposing traits grouped by their selection for maternal and paternal 
reproductive fitness. The theory could be usefully rooted and developed with reference to 
the lower-level perceptual and attentional phenomena from which social cognitive 
modules are developmentally refined. 
 
 
<C-text>There is a certain mechanistic appeal in theoretical science’s types and 
dimensions of personality. If we can believe in them, such paradigms hold out to us the 
hope of rendering a welter of human differences comprehensible in terms of cause and 
effect, and quantifiable in terms of position along some fundamental axis. To the extent 
that such models are valid, they garner a great deal in terms of predictive, explanatory, or 
at least descriptive power. To the extent that they are invalid, they lose a great deal in the 
projection of multifaceted reality onto flat theory. So theoretical abstractions are useful 
only insofar as they remain grounded in the phenomena that they purport to describe. 
Crespi and Badcock are keenly aware of this tension between theory and phenomenon, 
symbol and referent, and this is why they conclude with an apology for “overly simplistic 
terms” and “broad, crude strokes.” Despite this acknowledged coarseness of their model, 
Crespi and Badcock have little for which to apologise – for it’s the very breadth and force 
of such strokes that carry science across ideological limits and into new territories. 
 
Like Baron-Cohen’s (2002) empathising–systemising duality, which it extends and 
supplants, this mentalism–mechanism duality has something of an Aristotelian feel. 
Indeed, it recalls medicine’s first explanations of disease in terms of imbalance of the 
humours. In terms comprehensible to the ancient Greeks we might define the psychotic 
spectrum as an excess of the mentalistic humour and the autism spectrum as an excess of 
the mechanistic humour, and observe that these imbalances can be associated with 
unusual cognitive skills – just as Aristotle characterised what we now know as mood 
disorders as an excess of black bile and observed among his fellow philosophers a certain 
tendency towards melancholic constitutions (Pies 2007). The difference, of course, is that 
we don’t imagine our humoural abstractions as unitary, physical substances. Rather, 
we’re aware that at genetic and biochemical levels of analysis these mentalistic and 
mechanistic humours are implemented by dauntingly complex genetic networks that 
interact with the environment and with each other as development unfolds. This 
underlying complexity, though, is precisely the condition that makes these insubstantial 
humours so useful: In parallel with efforts to describe autism and schizophrenia in terms 
of network interactions among specific genes, we can now describe these conditions in 
terms of classes of genes united by their selection for maternal and paternal reproductive 
fitness. Thus the work of Crespi and Badcock enables a trait-level analysis of autism and 
psychosis that complements gene-level analysis. 
 
As Crespi and Badcock point out, this trait-level view in terms of mentalism and 
mechanism can in some regards muster greater descriptive and explanatory power than 
the more immediate view in terms of paternally and maternally imprinted genes 
themselves, because abnormal biases constructed by such genes can interact with normal 
programmes and gradients of brain development, spurring knock-on effects as the process 
of interactive specialisation of neural and cognitive systems unfolds (Johnson et al. 2002; 
Karmiloff-Smith 2007). Support for the notion of such multilevel cascades of perturbed 
development comes from studies of schizophrenia demonstrating deficits in early sensory 
processing (Butler & Javitt 2005; Butler et al. 2007; Uhlhaas & Silverstein 2005) and 
relating auditory frequency discrimination to deficits in affect recognition (Leitman et al. 
2007) and visual size discrimination to deficits in theory of mind (Uhlhaas et al. 2006), 
from studies of autism demonstrating enhanced perception of first-order stimuli (Mottron 
et al. 2006) and associating theory-of-mind performance with joint attention (Charman 
1997) and perceptual disembedding (Jarrold et al. 2000), and from models relating Crespi 
and Badcock’s cited variations in brain size to systems-level variation in the balance 
between short-distance and long-distance connectivities (Lewis & Elman 2008). In each 
of these instances, what seems on face an alteration of higher-order cognition is seen to 
be related to, and in some cases a consequence of, perturbations at lower levels of 
processing – and in this regard the cited conditions are not disorders of the “social brain” 
exclusively. Though such relationships may be most obvious in cases of clinical 
disorders, they seem unlikely to be limited to disordered cognition and instead may 
extend to normal variation – that is, to the entire continuum of cognitive variation 
between the mentalistic and mechanistic extremes. 
 
Further refinement will be necessary to explore aspects in which the autism spectrum and 
the less straightforwardly defined “psychotic spectrum” may have been miscast as 
opposites. As Crespi and Badcock note, some empirical aspects are not comparable 
between these two populations with existing data. Schizophrenia is diagnosed much later 
than autism, and therefore there remains a dearth of early developmental observations. 
For example, although the autistic amygdala is indeed abnormally large during childhood 
and therefore seems a counterpoint to the abnormally small amygdala in schizophrenia, 
by adulthood the autistic amygdala likewise has become abnormally small (Aylward et 
al. 1999; Rojas et al. 2004). Likewise, observations of frontal hypoactivation in autism 
may depend strongly on the behavioural task and on the latency at which activation is 
measured – in some contexts autistic frontal systems are hyperactivated (Takarae et al. 
2007). Regarding sensory filtering, autism shares with schizophrenia a decrease in 
prepulse inhibition (McAlonan et al. 2002; Perry et al. 2007), and although people with 
autism do often focus attention very strongly, in some cases maintaining attention is an 
issue, and many people with autism fulfill criteria for attention-deficit/hyperactivity 
disorder (Corbett & Constantine 2006). Familial association of autism and mood 
disorders (DeLong 2004) calls into question the inclusion of mood disorders within the 
“psychotic spectrum” in this context. The connectivity issues too remain to be sorted out; 
both autism and schizophrenia have been described as deficits in brain connectivity (Frith 
2005), but these may be secondary to developmental interactions whose antecedents 
differ between the two conditions. Despite such areas for refinement, the mentalism–
mechanism duality has strong potential to change the way we think about the relation of 
clinical disorders to normal human cognitive variation, as well as the evolutionary forces 
that have produced both. 
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